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Boredom to Panic
Modem highly automated systems are efficient, reliable and generally safe. Most of the time, the operator has little to do but monitor the overall situation and respond to the occasional minor deviation from normal. However, when something more significant does happen, the transition from normal to abnormal can be very rapid indeed. One petrochemical process operator put it succinctly: "Boredom to panic in a couple of seconds". Often the transition is accompanied by a barrage of attention-getters: bells, klaxons, bleepers, flashing lights and printer messages.
Humans do not cope well with this. They suffer from a condition called cognitive overload. Simply put, the operator is presented with more information than he can process and act upon in the time available. It has become widely accepted that a sustained rate of about two alarms per minute is as much as process operators can handle, with four or five per minute perhaps being acceptable for very short periods.
Excessive numbers of alarms can have two consequences. The first is fairly obvious -the higher the alann T oo many alanns can be worse than too few. This may not be immediately obvious, but incident investigations reveal that floods of alarms and messages from automatic systems distract the human operator from dealing with the problem, increase the stress on him and conceal important new information amongst a deluge of lowvalue, repeat or consequential warnings. In several wellknown cases this has been a major contributory cause of disaster. In the UK, the Health & Safety Executive (HSE) has identified alanns as one of its top ten concerns. Although there is no fonnal standard for alarm system design, broad compliance with the guidelines set out in a document l produced by the Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA) is considered to represent acceptably good practice. This paper aims to present an overview of the alarms issue and how significant improvements can be achieved within reasonable time and money constraints. The majority of examples and references cited are from the continuous process industries, including petrochemicals, oil refining and offshore oil and gas production. However, the principles can be applied equally well to power generation, utilities distribution, transport systems, indeed any control room situation where a large amount of information is presented to a small number of users. port engine that was in trouble, not the starboard one. The damaged engine lost power and, with the good engine shut down, the aircraft crashed on to the M 1 motorway, just short of the runway. 47 people lost their lives. Initially, there was speculation that the instrument wiring was incorrect -that the alarms had pointed to the starboard engine. However, the accident investigators were able to show that the instruments had functioned correctly.
In both cases, subsequent investigation showed that the technology had functioned as it had been designed to do. So were these tragic incidents just more cases of human error? It is not really as simple as that. If it is true that the technology functioned as designed, then it is just as clear that the humans reacted in the way we have evolved to do. Once into action mode, there is a powerful human tendency to "...confirm, rather than to falsify, hypotheses and this bias may be more prominent under stressful conditions when we all experience a degree of 'tunnel vision"'2.
Three Alarming Problems
In the process and related industries, alarm systems commonly suffer from three major problems.
Standing alarms
Standing alarms are alarms that remain active even though the plant is operating normally. They are usually caused by instrument faults, inappropriate alarm limit settings and out-of-service equipment. Although perhaps not unduly troublesome to the operator, a standing alarm is, in effect, a disabled alarm; if plant conditions change, it cannot alarm again. Standing alarms can also obscure other, more important information, although this tendency depends on the design of the alarm displays, with some formats being better than others in this respect.
Standing alarms are relatively easy to deal with. Instrument faults can be rectified, limits can be adjusted and logic can be devised to suppress alarms on out-ofservice equipment. However, this should be a process of continuous improvement, not a one-off exercise, and needs sustained, determined effort to succeed.
Nuisance and repeating alarms
Alarms which repeatedly activate then clear can be seriously distracting to the operator, particularly during upset conditions when they can make a significant contribution to alarm floods. The EEMUA Guidelines! and an earlier HSE research document 3 cite evidence that a large proportion (typically~) of alarms are caused by a small number of alarm points. Nuisance alarms are generally caused by faulty instruments, alarm limits set too close to normal operating conditions and ineffective (or no) use of deadbands, delay/repeat timers and similar mechanisms designed to minimise repeating alarms.
It is relatively easy to identify nuisance and repeating alarms using the alannlevent recording facilities provided by most modem control systems. As with standing alarms, reducing the number of nuisance and repeating alarms is not technically difficult, but does require a sustained and determined effort from the operations staff.
Feature +
Alarm floods This is by far the most serious of the three alarm problems. It is quite common for several hundred alarms to occur in the first ten minutes following an upset on a process plant, and peak alarm rates of well over one alarm per second are not at all unusual. The result is that the operator effectively abandons the alarm system, acknowledging alarms without looking at them. Not only is he likely to miss important information as a result, he may also misinterpret the information he does see, as happened on the USS Vincennes and over Kegworth.
The primary cause of alarm floods is not hard to fmdmost modem computer-based systems simply have too many alarms. For example, the Distributed Control System (DCS) on an offshore oil platform was found to have over 5,000 points with one or more alarm, and more than 10,000 individual alarms. One only has to imagine each of these being implemented as a 25x50 mm illuminated placque on a hardwired control panel to see the absurdity of this.
Although the cause of alarm floods may be simple, devising a solution is not. The problem is that the usefulness ofan alarm is extremely scenario-dependent. In other words, an alarm which, in one scenario, might give useful early indication of an incipient upset, can be just one of many consequential alarms in another. Furthermore, this dependence can often be chaotic, with slight differences in scenario giving rise to wildly differing outcomes with respect to which alarms are useful and which are not.
Nevertheless, in a recent pamphlet 4 the HSE has set out a challenging target for alarm rates of "no more than ten displayed in the first ten minutes following a major plant upset'. The rest of this paper explores the reasons why modem systems have so many alarms, and outlines, some practical techniques for optimising alarm systems so that they aid, rather than hinder, the operator during times of stress.
Why so Many Alarms?
Most techniques for reviewing plant design for safety (e.g. HAZOP) examine small sections of the process at a time, typically with between a handful and a few tens of measurement instruments and sensors. Look at this small section in isolation and it is easy to conclude that adding a few alarms makes it safer. However, look at the bigger picture, where the overall operation comprises many such sections, and the picture is quite different. A simple thought exper- Measuremem+Confrol 115 iment serves to illustrate this.
Consider a plant with no alarms at alL Adding a single alarm (provided it is reasonably sensibly chosen) should make the plant safer. However, adding a million alarms (say) would clearly be less than optimal, and certainly worse than having no alarms at alL The effect is illustrated in Figure 2 . Although the curve is speculative, and would depend upon many factors specific to a particular plant, the form of the curve must be as shown; i.e., there must be an optimum number of alarms for any plant.
This point seems to have eluded many plant and control system designers. Perhaps some feel that they may be criticised (even sued or prosecuted) for not specifYing an alarm should some subsequent incident investigation conclude that an alarm might have allowed the operator to avert a disaster. However, perhaps the most significant reason for specifYing too many alarms is also the most prosaic. It simply costs less to add an alarm than to discuss whether it is needed or not.
New Plants
The plant design process provides an opportunity to deal with many alarm problems at source -by prevention rather than cure. Put bluntly, ifan alarm isn't configured, it can't become a standing or nuisance alarm later, or contribute to any alarm flood.
It is important that design decisions regarding alarms are not made in an ad-hoc manner. Instead, decisions should be made within the framework of an overall design strategy and philosophy which should include a formal set of principles and policies for alarms. In particular, each alarm should require a formal justification and a formally defined operator response.
The HAZOP technique should be revised to treat alarms in the context of the overall operation, or perhaps not to consider alarms at all (on the basis that alarms cannot be relied upon to maintain safety). Alarm reduction techniques (see later) should be considered only where there is both a need and a realistic chance of success.
Finally, once the plant is operational, alarm system performance should be subject to a process of continuous review and improvement.
Existing Operations
An alarm system improvement exercise on an existing unit should also be anchored to a formal set of principles and policies. However, it may be better first to conduct a review of the design, configuration and performance of the existing system. The following statistics are relevant:
• Numbers and priorities of alarms configured.
• Number of standing alarms.
• Evidence of nuisance and repeating alarms.
• Alarm rates following upsets, trips etc.
Most modem systems provide some form of auto-documentation facility, and this is usually the best way of determining how many alarms are configured, and what their priorities are. Most systems also provide a current alarm report which can be run at regular intervals when the plant is operating normally, in order to identifY standing alarms. If the system has an alann/event historian facility, this can be used to investigate nuisance and repeating alarms, and to obtain some measure of average and peak alarm rates.
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If a design review or alarm performance survey shows there is a problem with alarms, then an alarm rationalisation exercise will probably be necessary.
Basic principles
What is the purpose of alarms? There are only two good answers:
• To cause the operator to take some action (e.g. to avoid a trip) • To cause the operator to pay extra attention to an area ofthe plant This leads to some b~cp~nciples for alarms: • Eliminate duplicate~laiins • Do not alarm normal/expected events • Do not alarm operator actions • Have no more than one pre-alarm for each trip cause
In addition, the number of alarms at the higher priority should be limited. The EEMUA Guidelines suggest no more than 10% at the highest priority and 20% at medium priority, with the remainder being low priority.
Risk-based methodology
A risk-based methodology, similar to that used in the IEC 61508 standard for assessing instrurnented protective systems, can be an effective tool in determining alarm priorities. The relevant questions are:
• Can the operator do anything?
• Is there time for him to act?
• What happens if he fails to act in time, or at all?
Risks are to personnel, the environment, equipment and production. With the possible exception of fire and gas systems, alarms should not be relied upon to prevent human injury or serious environmental damage.
Ergonomics and operability
An effective alarm review should take other aspects of plant operability into account. In particular, the ergonomics of the operating displays and the robustness ofthe automatic controls can have a large impact on the operator's ability to maintain his situational awareness during upsets, and to return the plant rapidly to normal thereafter. These subjects lie outside the scope of this paper, but it should be noted that the HSE investigation into a refinery explosion in 1994 4 identified poor display design, as well as excessive alarming, as being a major contributory cause of the incident.
Tools and Techniques
A number of techniques can assist with achieving good alarm system performance in practice.
Dealing with volume
As discussed earlier, one of the biggest problems with alarms is that there are simply too many. It is quite common for installations to have many thousands of individual alarms. Reviewing these individually would be prohibitive in terms of cost and time. Furthermore, it would be hard to maintain consistency among several reviewers working over an extended period.
One effective solution is to categorise alarms as far as possible, for instance: "trip pre-alarm", "failure to trip on demand", "product off-spec". All alarms in a category would then be assigned the same priority and other char- figure 4 : Group Alarm Status Detail acteristics. This technique can be very effective, but does require the reviewer to have a good understanding of the process and its operation. As with any generalisation, there will always be exceptions. However, care is needed to limit these to genuine cases, and to prevent inconsistencies creeping back in.
Alarm reduction
As a general rule, the simp~techniques work best. Alarm grouping can be useful when multiple events require a similar response from the operator, as is often true on machinery and package plant items. Grouping is particularly effective when combined with a first-up facility. The individual events are recorded only, not alanned. but are logically combined to generate a common alarm, usually on an alarm overview display. The first-up logic indicates the initiating cause on a detailed status display which also shows the current status of all the inputs in the group. When the upset is over, the operator can reset the first-up so that any new events are again alarmed. An example of this technique is presented below. Figure 3 shows an alarm overview display, in the fonn of alarm placques, as are used on hard-wired panels. Each placque represents either an individual alarm or a group of alarms. Clicking the mouse on a group placque calls up a detailed status and first-up display for the group, as illustrated in Figure 4 .
The detailed display shows the CUJTent status of all points contributing to the alann group, but only the first one to go into the alarm condition is flashing. When the upset is under control, and the operator wants to have alarms from this section of plant again, he can reset the first-up logic by clicking on the ACK button on the display.
The logic for grouped alarms with fu-st-up can be readily implemented on most modem systems, especially those supporting the mc 61131 Function Block Diagram language.
Another useful technique is dynamic alarm masking, but it needs to be applied with care. In a sense, filters, deadbands and delay/repeat timers are forms of dynamic masking and these should be used as a matter of course wher- FigUre 6 ever appropriate. However, the tenn dynamic masking is more properly applied to logic which automatically suppresses an alann:
• Temporarily, following a specified event (transient suppression)
• While aspecified condition prevails (consequential suppression) • On shutdown plant or machinery (out-of-service suppression)
An example of a section of an offshore oil production platfonn is illustrated in Figure 5 . Before alarm rationalisation this had 40 alanns, of which 22 were 'high' priority and 18 were 'medium'. The booster and export pumps are configured as duty/standby pairs, with automatic logic which starts the standby pump should the duty item trip. The pressure in the export pipeline is subject to severe disturbances, originating on another installation, which regularly cause a pump to trip, usually on low flow or low suction pressure. Changeover to the standby pumps generated a flurry of alarms, few of which were of any value.
Following an alarm rationalisation exercise, the number of alarms was reduced and the priority of many lowered. The new configuration is shown in Figure 6 and has 7 high priority alarms, 9 medium priority and 7 at low priority. However, this is not the whole story, as a number of other measures were also taken to reduce transient and consequential alanns, as well as those from out-of-service equipment. and for 15 seconds following any pump start • if the entire export system is shut down, all alarms are suppressed apart from those indicating high pressure, high level or failure to trip (these conditions are hazardous even though the plant is not running).
It should be noted that only these last conditions have potentially serious consequences. Their alarms are therefore the only ones set to 'high' priority.
Software tools
Given the large numbers of alarms that need to be examined, software tools are essential. Spreadsheet software such as Microsoft's Excel is probably the best way of collecting and analysing data in the early stages. However, a specialised database package such as AIM's SlLAlarm provides valuable additional facilities for long-term maintenance and improvement programmes.
For the Long Term
Following the initial review and rationalisation exercise, achieving and sustaining good alarm system performance requires long-term commitment to a process of continuous review and improvement. This should comprise three components:
Collect statistics
The ease of collecting statistics will depend upon the control system, although a PC-based message logger can be used if system facilities are inadequate. If reasonably practicable, the following should be collected:
• 24-hour average alarm rate • Highest 1,5, 10 and 30 minute peak rates • Most frequently occurring alarms • Current alarms; alarms active for 1, 5, 10 and 30 days Feature + Analyse performance This can be done using a PC-based message logger, the system's own facilities, or by exporting the alann/event records to a spreadsheet or database.
Strive for continuous improvement
The aim should be to sustain and improve upon the alarm system performance achieved after the initial review and rationalisation. In particular:
• Fix faulty instruments • Amend inappropriate alarm settings
Conclusions
Poor alarm system performance has been implicated in numerous serious incidents. The HSE has set challenging targets for alarm systems, particularly with respect to alarm floods. Although there is currently no formal standard for alarms, the EEMUA Guidelines are considered the nearest thing to one. There is no panacea for alarm problems. However, a pragmatic approach to alarm rationalisation can realise significant improvements at acceptable cost.
